Vanderwal v. Albar, Inc. Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 38085 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
6-6-2012
Vanderwal v. Albar, Inc. Appellant's Reply Brief
Dckt. 38085
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Vanderwal v. Albar, Inc. Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 38085" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3481.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3481
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
ECHO VANDERWAL and JLZ ENTERPRISES, ) DOCKET NO. 38085-2010 
INC., an Ohio corporation ) 
registered in Idaho, ) 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
ALBAR, INC., an Idaho corporation; 
Appellant, 
and 
ELMER B. SUDAU; T. OWEN MULLER and 
MARITA STEWART dba LAKE COUNTRY 
REAL ESTATE, 
Defendants. 
ALBAR, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
JLZ ENTERPRISES, INC., an Ohio 
corporation, and JAMES O. 
STEAMBARGE, a single man, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Bonner County Case 
No. CV-2007-1489 
(No. CV-2007-1841 
Consolidated) 
REPLY BRIEF 
REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of 
the state of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner 
THE HONORABLE STEVE VERBY, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
John A. Finney 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
120 East Lake Street, Ste 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Charles R. Dean, Jr. 
DEAN & KOLTS 
320 E. Neider Avenue, Suite 103 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
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REPLY STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Respondents in their Respondents' Brief attempt to 
portray this action as a case of the medical missionaries doing 
good work in Africa being induced to buy a real estate 
development which was a pig in a poke that lead to "ruination," 
all at the hands of the evil doers, Mr. and Mrs. Sudau. Mr. and 
Mrs. Sudau owned and operated a small "mom and pop" convenience 
store with fuel sales and a marina business known as the Dock-N-
Shop in Priest River, Idaho. 
Echo VanderWal, the principal of JLZ Enterprises, Inc. at the 
time of the Albar to JLZ transaction was an established real 
estate developer, growing up in the construction business and 
doing development work in both Ohio and Idaho. Tr. Pgs. 457-460. 
In 2005, JLZ also pursued a large development parcel on Kelso Lake 
Road in Bonner County Idaho, and was represented by Marita Stewart 
and Owen Mullen of Lake Country Real Estate. Tr. Pgs. 628-632. 
The Dock-N-Shop property and Ms. VanderWal's project of acquiring 
and assembling all the various waterfront parcels were not her 
first rodeo. 
JLZ through Echo VanderWal, prior to any contact with Albar 
or Mr. and Mrs. Sudau, purchased 3 parcels to the west of the 
Dock-N-Shop, which had been contaminated in the 2003 petroleum 
release and which was part of the ongoing remediation efforts. 
Tr. Pgs. 460-466. JLZ also acquired other parcels to the east of 
the Dock-N-Shop subsequent to the purchase from Albar, with her 
characteristic little investigation and taking on heavy 
encumbrances. Tr. Pgs. 627-637. 
JLZ and VanderWal were represented in each transaction by her 
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long time trusted friend Marita Stewart of Lake Country Real 
Estate and one of its agents Owen Mullen. In fact, Ms. Stewart 
signed Ms. VanderWal's signatures to the various documents for the 
Dock-N-Shop purchase and sale agreement. 
The petroleum release in 2003 and the remediation had been 
ongoing for several years by the time of the Albar to JLZ 
transaction. The Dock-N-Shop business had continuously operated 
during that time. The remediation was in existence through 
Albar's insurance coverage with PSTF and was pursued by the PSTF's 
contractor. A commercial remediation plan was in place and had 
IDEQ approval. The IDEQ was performing its regulatory oversight 
and there were no enforcement actions against Albar by the IDEQ. 
The documents making up the purchase and sale agreement 
provided for the sale of the ongoing business and recognized what 
was termed a "recent" spill (over two years prior), recognized 
that the ra~ediation process was ongoing, and provided for the 
remediation to continue. Albar was open in its understanding of 
the transaction, while JLZ was not forthright with its intentions. 
Albar had a long operating commercial convenience 
store, fuel sales, and marina business, known as the 
Dock-n-Shop. The 2003 fuel release was being 
remediated to commercial standards. 
All of the language of the PSA provides for CUP 
residential or hotel/rental development of the 
adjoining property, not the Dock-n-Shop. 
The PSA also provided for JLZ to accept the property in 
it's as is condition, and that JLZ chose to have 
inspections and investigations of that condition. 
REPLY BRIEF - 2 
Paragraph 3 of the Counter Offer in the PSA is the sole 
provision upon which JLZ asserts its breach of 
contract. It provides: "Seller has all responsibility 
and liability for recent gasoline spill on property and 
adjoining property." 
Prior to closing, JLZ continued its charade of 
intentions of operating the business, and Addendum #3 
dated 8/29 provided for Albar to aid in the transfer of 
licenses prior to and after closing. 
Also, prior to closing, JLZ apparently had enough 
infor.mation to deter.mine that institutional lending 
would not be available because of environmental 
concerns and she proposed that Albar carry part of the 
purchase price, with a pledge of the property, 
including the building and other improvements. 
Albar directed all in~~iries as to the status of the 
fuel spill and remediation to the regulatory 
authorities IDEQ, the insurer PSTF, and the consultant 
handing the remediation Kleinfelder, and authorized 
release of all infor.mation. 
At closing, the intention of the parties as set forth 
in the documents must be the yard stick to measure the 
contractual provision of paragraph 3 in the counter 
offer. Albar sold a going commercial concern, with a 
remediation in place that allowed the ongoing 
operations, and took back a security interest in the 
property and buildings. 
JLZ had investigated the fuel spill and existing 
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remediation, and closed on its purchase. Also, it 
submitted a CUP application to the City of Priest River 
for a mixed use residential and retail. 
In the Respondents' Brief, JLZ and VanderWal assert that 
"[t]o mitigate damages, JLZ stepped in and did what should have 
been done at the outset to remediate the site." Respondent's 
Brief, P. 2. JLZ did not contract for any specific site 
remediation effort or method. JLZ contracted for the existing 
established ongoing remediation. What JLZ failed to do at the 
time of contracting and closing, is not the measure of the 
parties' respective obligations under the contract. 
In addition, JLZ was, following trial and the payment of 
monitoring by the IDEQ, reimbursed for remediation costs which 
were for sums awarded as part of the offset damages to the amounts 
due Albar. 
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REPLY ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
I. THERE WAS NOT A BREACH OF CONTRACT 
The Respondents assert that the arguments regarding the 
District Court's findings and conclusions that a breach of 
contract occurred are "Incomprehensible." It is irrelevant if the 
Respondents comprehend the arguments. The District Court erred in 
imposing the clean up timeline and plan that it did (which just 
happened to align with those unilateral desires or directions 
asserted by the Buyer JLZ) to the contractual terms to find the 
ongoing and established remediation lacking. 
This is a case first and foremost involving the 
interpretation of the contract, specifically the provision in 
Counter-offer #1, paragraph 3, which provides "Seller has all 
responsibility and liability for recent gasoline spill on property 
and adjoining property." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). The District 
Court erred in its interpretation of the contract as set forth in 
the Appellant's Brief. The contract gives rise to a duty of good 
faith, which Albar met. The District Court's findings of fact 
regarding the contract interpretation are not supported by 
substantial, competent evidence. The District Court's conclusions 
of law regarding breach of contract are erroneous. 
This case is second about JLZ's enrollment in the voluntary 
cleanup program, the time it took to remediate, and the 
reimbursement which was in the process of being entitled to 
receive at trial and which it did ultimately receive. At trial, 
JLZ urged an interpretation of the contact contrary to the terms 
of the face of the contract. By the post-closing conduct by JLZ, 
the actual obligations of Albar under the contract could not be 
REPLY BRIEF - 5 
met. The conduct of JLZ directly impaired and impeded Albar's 
contractual obligations to JLZ regarding the ongoing remediation. 
The conduct and actions of JLZ cannot withstand the scrutiny 
of reasonableness, required by the law. Albar made several 
reasonable proposals to JLZ as the dispute arose and the issues 
went forward regarding remediation. In fact, it took JLZ several 
years to accomplish remediation of the property. The timeframe 
JLZ took was similar to the timeframes experienced by Albar, 
without the ongoing business operations on the premises or the 
fractured ownership of the parcels. JLZ did not accomplish any 
quicker what it complained of Albar not accomplishing. 
II. THE DAMAGES AWARDED WERE IN ERROR 
The Respondents assert that the arguments regarding the 
District Court's findings and conclusions in awarding damages for 
breach of contract are "Frivolous." It is irrelevant what the 
Respondents assert as to the arguments. The District Court erred 
in awarding JLZ damages for the sums JLZ asserted that were beyond 
the contemplation of the parties to the contract. In addition, 
the District Court failed to apply the doctrine of avoidable 
consequences to JLZ for it to mitigate its damages. 
Albar sold a going concern business and going concern 
petroleum release clean up. JLZ apparently always planned on 
clearing the property and developing it. Albar was assessed 
damages for JLZ clearing the property, not just of the fuel 
release remediation. It was never in the parties aligned 
expectations that Albar would pay to remove the buildings, fuel 
tanks, etc. The District Court awarded as damages sums for items 
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that were beyond the contemplation of the parties to the contract. 
In addition, JLZ had a duty to mitigate damages (also known 
as the doctrine of avoidable consequences) which the District 
Court failed to address whatsoever. The District Court failed to 
credit the clean up expenses which at the time of trial were 
unreimbursed, but which the record showed were available for 
reimbursement at the rate of 70% or $150,000, whichever is 
greater. The expenses were alleged to be greater than $150,000. 
Tr. Pgs. 616-619. At the time of trial $150,000 was the 
appropriate reduction in the offset trials. 
Here, JLZ sued Albar for breach of contract for failing to 
clean up the petroleum release at the real property. The 
situation of the clean up can be removed from the contentious 
discord and dislike between Al Sudau and Echo VanderWal over Ms. 
VanderWal's real estate development not moving forward. If one 
looks at this situation as just a contract for clean up, it can be 
greatly simplified and boiled down. If the stage is viewed as JLZ 
being a property owner that contained a petroleum release. If JLZ 
could contract with a government insured to clean up the property 
or could contract with a government agency to enroll the property 
in a clean up program, JLZ could pursue either path and get a 
clean up without having to ultimately be out of pocket. In 
addition, if one path does not get the result (and gives rise to 
damages), the duty to mitigate (or the doctrine of avoidable 
consequences) would require to person to reasonably pursue the 
other path rather than passively setting back and allowing damages 
to be incurred. See O'Neil v. Vasseur, 118 Idaho 257, 262-63 
(Ct. App. 1990) cited in the Appellant's Brief. 
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Whether limited as a measure of damage or based upon the 
doctrine of avoidable consequences, the law abhors duplicative 
recoveries. JLZ is not entitled to a windfall, that is offset 
damages to the amounts due to Albar and affirmative reimbursement 
from DEQ funds. JLZ cannot recover more than the actual loss 
suffered. The reimbursement from DEQ reduces the actual loss 
suffered by JLZ. 
The District Court erred in its award of damages for breach 
of contract as set forth in the Appellant's Brief. The District 
Court's findings of fact regarding damages are not supported by 
substantial, competent evidence. The District Court's conclusions 
of law regarding damages are erroneous. JLZ cannot recover 
damages beyond the contemplated scope of the parties and damages 
awarded must be tempered by the duty to mitigate. At the time of 
trial, JLZ was entitled to reimbursement from the IDEQ pilot 
project, but had only failed to receive reirr~ursement by its own 
conduct. The District Court erred in not even considering the 
duty to mitigate. 
III. THE REMEDIATION REIMBURSEMENT WAS NOT PROPERLY CONSIDERED 
AND APPLIED TO THE DAMAGES AWARDED 
In addition to arguing the duty to mitigate at trial based 
upon the $150,000.00 cap on reimbursable expenses, following 
trial Albar sought relief for the actual funds then received from 
IDEQ by JLZ. Albar sought relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b) (2), (5), 
or (6). The decision of the District Court failing to address the 
duty to mitigate at trial was already on appeal. The Rule 60(b) 
motion was not an ~permissible attempt at an untimely Rule 59 
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motion for a new trial or for reconsideration. The Rule 60(b) 
motion was not an attempt substitute for a timely appeal. A 
timely appeal had already been taken. 
New evidence (not just newly discovered pre-existing 
evidence) is allowed on a Rule 60(b) motion. As set forth in 
Moffett v. Moffett, 151 Idaho 90, 96, 253 P.3d 764, 770 (Ct. App. 
2011) " ... I.R.C.P. 60(b) authorizes the presentation of new 
evidence, see Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 263, 646 P.2d 1030, 
1034 (Ct.App.1982), and subsection (b) (5) of the rule provides 
for relief from a final judgment if 'it is no longer equitable 
that the judgment should have prospective application.'" 
If the District Court's actually considered the issue and 
just silently chose not to reduce the offset damages awarded on 
the basis that JLZ had not received the funds or could not afford 
to pay for the remaining monitoring, then the fact of actual 
completion of the monitoring and receipt of the funds may effect 
the District Court's decision. The new evidence presented was 
relevant and was timely presented. 
The facts that subsequent to trial JLZ completed final 
monitoring, received clearance from the IDEQ for the property, 
applied for reimbursement from the IDEQ pursuant to the pilot 
rebate program, and received an actual rebate of $145,021.95 for 
much of the same sums ($198,742.64) as were awarded as offset 
damages ($228,044.72) against ALBAR for breach of contract, meets 
the requisite showings under IRCP 60(b) (2), (5), or (6). 
ALBAR is entitled to relief from the amount of offset damages 
awarded to JLZ in the Judgment And Decree Of Sale entered July 27, 
2010 for the sums received from the completion and reimbursement 
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to JLZ. The reimbursement makes it no longer equitable that the 
amount of net judgment in favor of ALBAR, INC. for foreclosure 
should be reduced to extent prior to reimbursement. The 
reimbursement also justifies relief from the operation of the 
original calculation of offset damages in the judgment. JLZ is 
only entitled to a single recovery for compensatory damages for 
breach of contract. JLZ received the sum of $145,021.95 from the 
IDEQ pilot program to reimburse it for clean up expenditures. 
Those same expenditures were the basis for the award of breach of 
contract damages. The net sum of damages after reimbursement is 
the only proper calculation if the District Court's findings and 
conclusions are otherwise upheld. 
Alternatively, if the offset damages awarded against ALBAR 
are not reduced by the reimbursement received, ALBAR would be 
subrogated to the funds reimbursed and/or would be entitled to 
equitable reimburs~uent from the funds received by JLZ from the 
IDEQ. The Court should reduce the offset damages awarded in this 
action for the sake of judicial economy, rather that have ALBAR 
commence a separate action for subrogation and equitable 
reimbursement. 
As set forth above, ALBAR is entitled to the relief sought, 
specifically a reduction of the offset damages by the sum received 
by JLZ from the IDEQ. 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court's findings and conclusions of a breach of 
contract should be reversed. If the findings and conclusions of 
breach are upheld, the damages awarded by the District Court 
should be reversed based upon the contemplated damages of the 
parties or reduced based upon the duty to mitigate. If the 
damages are upheld, Albar should receive relief from the damages 
awarded, for the sums received for reimbursement to JLZ from the 
IDEQ for remediation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~yt--daY of June, 2012. 
~a:'I~ ~}p. 
HNA: FINNEY 
~INNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorney for Appellant ALBAR 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this L{11--daY of June, 2012, two 
(2) true and correct copies of the foregoing, were served by 
deposit in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and were addressed to: 
Charles R. Dean Jr. 
Dean & Kolts 
320 E. Neider Ave., Suite 103 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815 
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